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It has become apparent that in order for an AUV to be a more reliable self-
sufficient system, it must have on-line failure detection and resolution capability. In
support of this the AUV must have reconfigurable systems so as to be able to take
corrective action against resolvable failures. A simulator has been designed using
SIMULINK in order to analyze failure modes associated with the NPS Phoenix AUV
steering system. The analyses of these failure modes have been used to identify possible
signals for steering system fault detection. Finally, a rule based algorithm was developed
which can be converted into a format that ultimately could be implemented in a fuzzy
logic set, for later insertion into the Phoenix tactical level software. This methodology
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X,Y Global position of vehicle feet
u,v Velocity of vehicle with respect to a body-fixed
reference frame
ft/s
r Yaw rate of vehicle rad/s
T Yaw (heading angle) radians
com Commanded heading angle radians
Y„ Hydrodynamic force in body-fixed system with respect
to(.)
pounds
N Hydrodynamic moment in body-fixed system with
respect to (.)
lbs-ft
m Mass of vehicle slugs
XG Coordinate of center of gravity in body-fixed system feet
I2 Moment of inertia in body-fixed system ft
4
P Mass density of water lbs/ft
3
L Length of vehicle feet
°urb'°urs'°lrb'"lrs Upper and lower bow and stern rudder deflection
angles
radians
com Commanded rudder angle radians
eo<) Observer error with respect to (.)
(measured (.) minus estimated (.))
same as (.)
e, Servo error
(estimated minus commanded heading angle)
radians
Time rate of change of (.) Q/s
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A. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
Over the past decade more and more research has been devoted to the
development of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV's). The potential for AUV's
is large and eventually, even Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV's) will incorporate
some of the new AUV technology. The potential commercial and military uses for
AUV's far out number those of ROV's, not to mention the benefits it can provide to
ocean science research. Simply put, AUV's are our future.
Technology of AUV's has come a long way over the last decade. However,
much research must still be conducted in all areas of AUV technology. Some of the
more recent works are cited here to show the broad spectrum of study that is still
ongoing. Healey and Lienard (1993) have shown that a multivariate sliding mode
autopilot based on state feedback, designed assuming decoupled modeling, is quite
satisfactory for the combined speed, steering, and diving response of a slow speed
AUV. Marco and Healey (1996) have demonstrated a method to navigate an
autonomous underwater vehicle in a local area using an acoustic sensor for position
information derived from feature detection. Further developments have been achieved
by Healey, et al. (1994) in hover control behavior using the ST1000 and ST725 high
frequency sonars to provide data about the environment. Byrnes, et al. (1996) has
proposed a tri-level control system architecture called the Rational Behavior Model
(RBM) as an approach to autonomous and automatic control of systems. A work
which describes the advantages of AUV's over ROV's or manned submarines was
written by Marco (1996), in which he designed and verified a working hybrid control
system combining mission management with robust motion controllers.
An area which is now receiving more focused attention is Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA). This is because it is becoming more readily apparent that
in order for an AUV to be a totally self-sufficient system, it must have an on-line
failure detection and resolution algorithm. This algorithm must work in tandem with
an AUV whose systems are reconfigurable. The scope of this work takes a very small
step towards this goal. Its purpose is to design an effective failure detection and
resolution algorithm for one subsystem (steering) of the NPS Phoenix. The Phoenix is
an underwater vehicle used by the Naval Postgraduate School to conduct AUV
research.
Previous literature pertinent to this particular area of research is very abundant.
A brief summary of some basic fault detection methods along with some examples can
be found in Isermann (1984). The examples provided were detecting faults in an
electrically driven centrifugal pump and leak detection for pipelines. Healey (1993)
discusses the use of both batch least squares and Kalman Filters for system parameter
identification as a means to detect a change in performance. Bell, et al. (1992) has
developed a tool that automates the reasoning portion of an FMEA. The prototype has
been created and successfully passed a test and evaluation program. A program which
automates the prediction of the effect of failure modes for electrical systems has been
developed by Hunt, Price and Lee (1993). This program is called FLAME (Functional
Level Analysis of failure Modes and Effects). Finally, Healey (1992) addresses the
use of Kalman Filters and Artificial Neural Networks to provide the detection, and
isolation of impending system failures.
For some time the Navy has funded the development of software tools for
performing automated on-line system fault detection. It has been agreed, however, that
too much detail can lead to unwieldy systems. Also, for a useful automated diagnostic
system to be able to improve the reliability of AUV's, only those problems that can be
mitigated during a mission need to be identified . Therefore, this work concentrates on
"subsystem level" fault detection rather than "component level" detection. The
difference lies in the granularity established by the system models used as the
detection basis. In principle, a diagnostic system is only able to detect faults at the
level of its design model basic granularity. For instance, if a subsystem or component
(G) is modeled by its input, output and disturbance signals (Figure 1.1), we can, under
some conditions relating to the observability of the system model, infer the satisfactory
operation of the subsystem (G) with regard to a desired behavior. If a model based
filter is proposed for the control signal (e ) such that Gc is a model for G, changes in
G from any source are detectable through the input/output signals (u, Y) and in
particular the servo error (e
s
= Ycom - ~ ) and the observer error (e = Y - v». The
input signal (u) is determined by the system controller (C).
B. SCOPE OF THIS WORK
The driving force of this thesis is threefold: 1) Earlier work by Bahrke (1992)
broke down the Phoenix AUV into separate subsystems and generated equations that
could be used to model these systems. The work in this thesis seeks to show that
these equations can, with reasonable accuracy, model the AUV steering system using a
CAD program such as SIMULINK in MATLAB. 2) The simulator designed in this
work is used to conduct an intensive study of all the possible failure modes that could
be related to the steering system. 3) Armed with the knowledge provided by all the
simulations, an algorithm is developed whose purpose is to detect steering system
failures and reconfigure the system (when necessary) to operate efficiently, or abort the
mission.
Chapter II focuses on the design of an effective, user friendly, FMEA simulator
geared towards the NPS Phoenix AUV (Figure 1.2) steering system. It was very
important in this chapter to ensure that the vehicle was accurately modeled. However,
major emphasis was given toward user friendliness, because future work in this area
will require the ability to operate and possibly change the simulator.
Chapter III categorizes the various failure modes that could occur, simulates
them and places these results in tabular form to help determine their distinguishing
features. Further study is done to show which failure modes can be ignored (small
effect on system), which ones must be prevented at all costs (either devastating to the
system or undetectable), which ones will require system reconfiguration to ensure
continued effective operation and which ones will require a mission abort. How the
steering system should be reconfigured for various failures is also addressed. The
ultimate goal of developing a useful algorithm for failure detection and resolution was
then realized.
Figure 1.1 Simple Example of Subsystem Modelling.
Figure 1.2 Nava 1 Postgraduate School 'Phoenix' AUY. From Marco (1996).

H. DESIGN OF A STEERING SYSTEM FMEA ANALYSIS TOOL
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to show the steps taken in the design of a
steering system failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) tool. This FMEA tool is
specifically designed to simulate (using MATLAB/SIMULINK) the response of the
NPS Phoenix AUV to various failures that could occur in its steering system.
Naturally, the design had to be carried out in steps. The dynamics of the vehicle in
response to steering system commands had to be simulated first. Once that was
achieved, a PD controller was designed, and then a state estimator. Finally, a method
of artificially inserting failures into the system was added to the simulation. The
overall block diagram is shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 may be useful in
understanding the geometry and axes definitions of the AUV.
B. VEHICLE DYNAMICS RESPONSE TO SPEED AND RUDDER INPUTS
It was shown by Fossen (1994) that the response of the vehicle to speed and
rudder inputs can be reduced to a force equation, a moment equation and the three
Euler equations relating _v, y an(^ m ^ was assumed that the vehicle operates in
level flight without roll, and that body drag forces are negligible. The resulting
equations are:
mv + mxGr -Yf- YJ> = -mur + Ypr + Yvuv + u

















The following additional assumptions were made by Bahrke (1992):
1. The bow and stern rudders operate with equal magnitudes of deflection but
opposite direction (5rs = -8rb).
2. The size and shape of the bow and stem rudders is identical (Y6 = Y6rb =
Y6rs).
3. From vehicle geometry NSrb = 0.283LY5 and N6rs = -0.377LY5 .
Along with these assumptions the two rudder inputs (5rs, 5rb) were divided up into four
inputs (5^, d ks , 5mh , 5^) f°r simulation purposes. This allows any one rudder input
to be altered for the purpose of rudder failure insertion and, ultimately, the analysis of
the effects of that failure on the vehicle. Using the above relations and rearranging,
the force and moment equations can be written as follows:
{m - iyv + (mxG - Yr)r = Yvuv * {Yr -m)ur+Q.Su
2Yb{S urb * 6fri + 5„ + 5J











lrb) -0.377(S u„ + 6J]
In order to model the force and moment equations above, it is necessary to
determine the values of the constants and coefficients that appear in the equations.
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Appendix A contains the values of these constants and coefficients (Bahrke, 1992).
However, the coefficients are in their dimensionless form. Thus it is necessary to
dimensionalize the coefficients such that each term in the force equation has units of lbs.
and each term in the moment equation has units of lbs. -ft. The coefficients of the
Phoenix AUV were dimensionalized by multiplying each one with the appropriate form
of 0.5 pu mL " (Healey, 1996). The resulting equations were rearranged such that the
force equation was solved for v and the moment equation was solved for r . They are
shown here in their final form for simulation:
v = -0.190597r'-0.20901«v-0.51091wr+0.011525w 2(6 .+8,. +6 +8, )v urb Irb urs Irs'
r = -0.09263v -0.19988a/- + 0.0408872k 2[0.283(S^ + 8
/rfc
) -0.377(8^ +8/M)]
The above two equations along with the equation for T were used to form the Steering
block of Figure 2.1.
The steering system model is shown in Figure 2.3. The inputs to the model are
the forward speed of the vehicle (u) and the four rudder deflections (8
(
X Speed is varied
by changing the output value of the Speed block of Figure 2.1. The rudders get their
commands from the output of the PD controller block. The outputs of the model are
sway velocity (v), yaw rate (r) and heading angle (T). The last things added to the model
were two files containing random, low frequency, system noise (noise 1.mat and
noise2.mat). These system noise files were added to the right sides of the v* and
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j. equations. They simulate the added forces and moments that occur naturally due,
mainly, to wave action in the water. Appendix B contains the MATLAB program
(obtained from professor Healey) used to generate these system noise files.
The XY output block of Figure 2.1 was created so that a graph of the vehicle's
XY position could be plotted. This graph further aids in understanding the vehicle's
response to various failure modes. The internals of this block are shown in Figure 2.4.
The XY output is plotted as a function of the inputs u, v and *P.
C PD CONTROLLER DESIGN
In order to design a PD controller the equations for • , • and ^ had to be
linearized about a single velocity and then placed in their state space form:
x=Ax + B6
The form that is shown above requires that the four rudder inputs be combined into
one commanded rudder input (5com ). The controller design involves pole placement to
find a 1x3 matrix (k) such that the control law is 5com = -kx. Linearization was done
about u = 1 ft/s and the 3x3 A matrix had one eigenvalue at zero and the other two
were complex with real parts at -0.1840. Given these particular eigenvalues the three
poles were placed at about -0.2 to approximately match the open loop poles at -
0.1840. The resulting gain matrix was k = [0.3587 4.29 0.6949], which produced the
following control law:
12
6com - -0.3587v -4.29r -0.6949Y
There are two problems with the above control law. The first problem is that it
is based on a model that was linearized about u = 1 ft/s. If the vehicle is travelling at
u = 3 ft/s the control law is too fast and the vehicle makes a tighter turn than it
should. We want a controller that will allow the vehicle to follow the exact same path
regardless of its speed. The solution to this problem is to perform the above controller
design procedure for various values of u in the hopes of determining a relationship
between the controller gains and u. If this relationship can be found then a nonlinear
controller design can be obtained with controller gains properly varying as a function
of u. The second problem is that v, r and *F go to zero in steady state (8com = 0). It's
desirable to have v and r go to zero, but *¥ should reach some commanded heading
V com/ -
The solution to the first problem is as follows. It was determined that k, and
k 2 vary inversely proportional to u, however, changing u had absolutely no effect on
k 3 . The second problem was solved simply by subtracting
x¥com from
x¥. The block
diagram of the PD controller is shown in Figure 2.5. Here is the final control law:
s<™ =^(-0.3587v-4.29r) -0.6949(T - Ycom)




i'com . The State Estimator block of
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Figure 2.1 provides ^, p and * . The commanded heading block of Figure 2.1
provides ^com . The controller has two outputs; one for the bow rudders (5com ) and one
for the stern rudders (-5com ).
Commanded heading is determined by a switching network (Figure 2.6). It has
a Clock input which controls the switches to allow the output 0F
coin) to change at the
desired time during the simulation. This allows the steering system to receive
different heading commands during the simulation.
D. STATE ESTIMATOR DESIGN
The design of the state estimator followed closely the design of the PD
controller. The equations for
-\, j. and • were linearized about a single velocity
and then placed in
the following state space estimator form:
x=Ax+Bbrnm +Le„,,co c\.)
It is assumed there are only sensors for r and x¥, and that v has only an estimated
value (v)). Therefore, there are only two observer errors (e
or
and eoT). Since e0() is a
2x1 matrix the observer gain matrix (L) must be 3x2. Linearization was done about u
= 1 ft/s and pole placement was performed to obtain L. Following normal convention
the observer poles were placed at -0.4, which is twice the distance from the origin as
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the controller poles. The following observer gain matrix was realized:
[Lv L2; L3 , L4; L5, ZJ = [1.2025, 0.0; 0.4219, 0.0; 1.0, 0.41]
Again there is the problem that the state estimator is based on a linear model.
If the vehicle is travelling at u = 3 ft/s, the estimator will be too slow. There must be
a relationship between u and L. The state estimator design was performed using
various values of u, and it was determined that L2, L4 and L 5 do not change at all as u
is changed. However, it was discovered that L,, L3 and L6 are directly proportional to
u. The State Estimator block is shown in Figure 2.7. This block has the same inputs
as the steering block but also has the sensor inputs r and *F. It is essentially the same
block as the steering model with an added term (Le
o()). The outputs are the estimated
values of v, r and *F (v), z and * ).
E. FAILURE MODE INSERTION
In order to study the effects of various failure modes, a method must be
installed to allow failures to be easily inserted into the simulation. Steering system
failures can be cataloged into two basic groups: Rudder failures and sensor failures.
Rudder and sensor blocks were added to achieve this goal.
1. Rudder Blocks
Four rudder blocks were installed (one for each rudder to match the Phoenix
configuration), as can be seen in Figure 2.1. It is relatively easy to modify the
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simulation to match other AUV configurations such as that proposed for the Navy's
UUV. The diagram of a rudder block is shown in Figure 2.8, and it can be seen that
it is a switching network much like the commanded heading block. It has two inputs,
5com and Clock. The clock input is used to control the switches to insert a failure in
5com at any time during the simulation. It is capable of simulating many failures such
as stuck rudder, hard rudder, loose rudder or limited rudder. The output of a rudder
block is either the ordered rudder position or the failed rudder position.
2. Yaw Rate Sensor Blocks
Building a block that can accurately simulate the output of a sensor and the
output of a failed sensor is again done with the use of switches. The clean output
signal is picked off of the Steering block and then corrupted with noise. The noise is
added to make the simulation more realistic since no sensor can provide a totally
noise-free output. The clean signal and the noise each have their own sensor block to
allow one of them to be modified during the simulation without affecting the other.
For example, a signal with an unusually high noise level could be simulated, or the
noise level may be normal but the signal itself is incorrect. Problems that could occur
with a sensor besides increased noise are: saturation, loss of input, loss of output and
constant bias.
A typical sensor noise block is shown in Figure 2.9. The Clock input controls
the time at which the problem of high sensor noise would occur (if so desired in the
simulation). Basically, the block takes the noise input and adjusts its level for output
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to be added to the clean sensor signal. Figure 2.10 shows a sensor signal block. It
takes the clean signal, corrupts it and sends the output to be added to the noise signal.
3. Heading Angle Sensor Blocks
Obviously the primary sensor for the steering system is the heading sensor, and
it will be proven later that any failure of this sensor is catastrophic. Armed with this
knowledge the Psi sensors block was added to Figure 2.1. This block assumes that
since the heading sensor is so important the vehicle will be equipped with three of
them. It is shown in Figure 2.11. It has three sensor and three noise blocks so as to
simulate a problem with one or more of the three sensors at a specified time using the
Clock input. The other two inputs are the clean signal (*F) and the estimated signal
( * ). Three values of observer error (eo4,), one for each sensor, are calculated. These
observer errors are fed into a function (see Appendix C), similar to a median filter,
which extracts any suspect errors and averages the rest. A suspect observer error is
one which exceeds a certain small threshold. The threshold is simply chosen to be
slightly greater than acceptable noise amplitudes. This is because during normal
steering system operation eoY should only contain zero mean noise. In the case of all
three errors being suspect (such as when a steering system failure occurs) the function
simply averages them all. The output of this block is the average eo4, which is sent to
the State Estimator block of Figure 2.1.
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F. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown, step by step, how an FMEA tool was designed so as
to study the NPS Phoenix AUV steering system. Much had to be known about the
dynamics of the AUV in order to produce a working simulator. The use of switches
in sink with a running Clock helped make the simulator more user friendly. The user
simply has to change the settings of these switches to create the desired simulation. If
input files had been used rather than switches, the user would have to edit the files
every time the simulation was changed. It has been noted here that there are other
ways to insert failures and rudder commands, but the method used in this work was
deemed to be the easiest to understand and the most user friendly. The remainder of
this work seeks to accomplish a thorough analysis of the Phoenix AUV steering
system using the newly designed FMEA tool. The final task will be to establish an
algorithm that can be incorporated in the Phoenix software for failure detection and
resolution.
18




















































































































































































figure 2.11 Primary Sensor Auctioneering and Averaging Block.
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m. PHOENIX AUV STEERING SYSTEM FAILURE MODES ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to show the results of a comprehensive FMEA
on the Phoenix AUV steering system. First it was determined what types of failures
could occur involving the steering system. Each of these failures was then simulated
using the FMEA tool already designed (Chapter II), and each one was compared to the
normal (trouble free) response. The results of these simulations were put in tabular
form from which they could be studied (for similarities and trends) and further
categorized. These studies resulted in many important conclusions involving vehicle
dynamics, failure detection and in some cases failure prevention. Further analysis
helped formulate possible solutions to the failures. The end result is an algorithm
which, when converted to the proper form, can be incorporated in the Phoenix
software for failure detection and resolution.
B. FAILURE CATEGORIZATION
In analyzing the AUV steering system it was determined that any failure
occurring on the vehicle, if it had any effect on the steering system, could be




There are five possible rudder failures that can occur:
(1) Loose Rudder:The rudder in question will not respond (stuck at zero). For
the Phoenix (which has four rudders) the other rudders can still turn the
vehicle, however its response to course changes will be slower.
(2) Stroke Limited RudderThe rudder in question does not have its full range
of motion. As in the loose rudder case, the vehicle will simply respond more
slowly to course changes.
(3) Stuck Rudder:A rudder is stuck in some position other than zero; the
special case of a rudder stuck at zero is considered in this work as a loose
rudder. In this case the remaining rudders must turn to counteract the yaw rate
caused by the stuck rudder. Once this has been done the vehicle will no longer
be heading in the commanded direction, and vehicle response to further course
changes will be slowed as in the loose or stroke limited cases.
(4) Hard Rudder:A rudder is stuck in the hard right or hard left position. This
is simply a special case of stuck rudder.
(5) No Rudder Response : All rudders are stuck at zero. In this case the vehicle
steering system would not respond at all to commanded course changes.
There are also five possible sensor failures. Since the steering system has two
sensors of interest these failures would have to be applied to each sensor, resulting in
ten sensor failure modes. The five possible yaw rate sensor failures are as follows:
(1) Increased Noise Level :The more noise that a sensor reads the harder it is
to determine the actual value of the parameter being measured. This is a very
difficult failure to detect. The intent of modelling this failure is to show that
the steering system can operate effectively with as high as a ten fold increase
in noise level, thus eliminating the need for detecting it.
(2) Loss of Inputln this case the state estimator will only receive noise from
the yaw rate sensor. Since the steering system parameters are fully observable
with the heading sensor alone, a loss of the yaw rate sensor should have only a
small effect on the vehicle's steering system performance. Detecting this
failure may not even be necessary.
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(3) Loss of Output:Once the increased noise level scenario is proven to have little
effect, the results of this failure should be the same as a loss ofinput, since the
state estimator is getting zero from the sensor rather than noise.
(4) Sensor Saturation:The state estimator gets a large value of yaw rate In order
to reduce the controller signal to the rudders to zero (so the vehicle doesn't go in
circles) the estimated value of heading will be incorrect. The result of this failure
should be a large change in heading without the command to do so.
(5) Sensor Bias:The bias in yaw rate will cause an incorrect estimate of heading
as in the saturated sensor case. Again, the result should be an uncommanded
heading change. The amount of heading change will depend on the size of the
bias.
It is assumed that since the heading sensor is the primary sensor for the steering
system, failures of that sensor should be prevented. However, the following two failure
modes were studied in order to show the severity of such failures and the need for
prevention:
(1) Stuck Heading Sensor :With a stuck heading sensor the vehicle would respond
to course changes by going in circles because it would never reach its commanded
heading.
(2) Heading Sensor Bias:With a heading sensor bias the vehicle's course would
always be off by the amount of the bias. This failure is impossible to detect.
The actual failures studied in this work, along with a complete description of each
failure's simulation scenario, are listed in Table 3.1 . It should be noted that each
simulation starts with the same initial heading and speed (T = 0.0 rads, u = 3 ft/s).
C. PLACING SIMULATIONS IN TABULAR FORM
Each scenario of Table 3.1 was performed twice; once without a failure and once
with the failure inserted. The FMEA results are displayed in Table 3.2. The first column
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of Table 3.2 lists the failure modes. The next nine columns represent the signals that
would be available to the AUV for analysis. The following entries appear in these
columns:
TST' No difference between the normal and failed responses.
'S' A steady state difference exists between the normal and
failed responses.
T A transient difference exists between the normal and
failed responses. This means the two responses coalesce
in steady state, making detection more difficult.
'I' The difference between the normal and failed responses
increases without bound.
Column 1 1 indicates the failure severity (FS). Entries include:
'L' Low: failure's effect is small; no correction required.
'M' Medium: failure's effect is large enough to require
correction such as sensor removal, gain changes and/or
bias insertions.
'H' High: failure is not correctable or the AUV can not
operate effectively.
The last column in Table 3.2 indicates the difficulty of detection (DD). Possible entries
are:
'L' Low: can be detected in steady state using available signals.
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'M' Medium: Since the normal and failed responses are equal
in steady state, a maneuvering transient is required for
detection/verification of failure.
'H' High: not detectable.
D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In order for the AUV to be able to detect failures and respond accordingly, the
following questions must be answered. Can all the possible steering system failures be
detected? In other words, can we distinguish between a failure and normal operation?
It follows that if all failures can not be detected, can we prevent those that are
invisible to the AUV's available signals and sensors? Finally, is it possible to
distinguish between the detectable failures so that proper action can be taken in
response? The answers to these questions will become apparent in the remainder of
this work.
In analyzing Table 3.2, it can be assumed that any failed response that has a
steady state or transient difference with the normal response can be detected. A
difference that increases without bound is considered very easy to detect. Excluding
two of the failure modes (high r sensor noise and bias on *¥ sensor) it is possible to
detect and distinguish between all steering system failures studied. It will be shown
later that high r sensor noise does not have a large enough effect on the vehicle to
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even be called a failure. Also, it will be shown that preventing T sensor failures is
essential for proper steering system operation.
It may be assumed that when the difference between the failed and normal
responses is steady or increasing, there is a failure. The system then has only to
determine the exact nature of the failure and what its response will be. But what if
the failure only shows up as a transient? It is not good practice to assume a failure
has occurred after detecting it once (false alarms do happen). Some failures require a
maneuver to verify them, because their normal and failed responses coalesce after the
transient is over. Once such a failure has been detected, it is proposed that the
maneuver of Figure 3.1 be performed for verification. It is also suggested that this
maneuver be executed periodically, whenever the vehicle is not performing any course
changes, so as to be able to detect one of these failures early rather than when the
vehicle is in a critical situation.
One more thing that can be seen from Table 3.2 is how the observer errors
respond to the various failure modes. It should be noted here that e
or
and -e0<f are
always zero unless a failure has occurred. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show e
or
vs time and
eoT vs time respectively for the maneuver of Figure 3.1. The only variation in the two
signals can be attributed to sensor noise. If *¥ sensor failures are prevented and r
sensor noise is not considered a failure, then e
or
and eoy alone can be used to
determine if a failure has occurred. Any non-zero value of e
or
or e <j, can indicate there
is a problem. Of course, if this non-zero value was just a transient then the maneuver
of Figure 3.1 must be carried out to verify the failure actually exists. Once it has been
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determined that there is a problem, e
or
and e y can be used together to distinguish
whether a rudder problem or an r sensor problem exists. If a rudder problem exists,
only e
or
will be non-zero. If an r sensor problem exists, both e
or




In reality a loose rudder is one that is no longer coupled to its servo
mechanism and is at the mercy of the hydrostatic forces in the water. It is assumed
here that a loose rudder is one that is stuck at zero. We could even call this a special
case of a stuck rudder. The steering system will still operate with a loose rudder, but
the vehicle dynamics will be slowed down. In other words, it will take a little longer
for the vehicle to perform the desired course change. The severity of this failure mode
can be measured by the magnitude of the transient of e
or
.
If | eor I < 0.05, then the ship will still be within one ship length (7.3 ft) of its
desired track after the completion of a 90 degree turn, thus no action will be taken
(failure severity is low). A 90 degree turn was chosen because this corresponds to the





< 0.075, then a 90 degree turn will result in the vehicle being
off its course by more than one ship length but enough rudder response remains to
correct the problem. The problem is corrected by increasing the magnitudes of the
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controller gains in order to speed up the response of the remaining rudders. This has
the effect of speeding up the already slowed dynamics of the vehicle. With the
controller gains changed the vehicle can perform its 90 degree turn and still stay





> 0.075, then the failure can not be corrected to keep the vehicle
within one ship length after a 90 degree turn. This would be cause to abort the
mission.
In the loose rudder scenario studied in this work both bow rudders were stuck
at zero. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show e
or
= T and e0<f -N'. Also, the magnitude of eor is
approximately 0.05. Figure 3.6 shows that the path followed by the vehicle is about
one ship length off of the normal path. To verify that the observer errors are correct,
the vehicle can check its individual rudder position sensors. Figure 3.7 shows the
upper bow rudder to be stuck at zero. This failure can be corrected by increasing the
controller gains, thus speeding up the vehicle's turn.
2. Stroke Limited Rudder
For the purposes of this work a stroke limited rudder is one that no longer has
its full range of motion. This could be caused by a faulty servo mechanism or a
foreign object physically limiting the rudder's travel. Like in the case of a loose
rudder, the steering system will still perform its job but vehicle dynamics will again be
slowed down. The exact same procedure, as in the loose rudder case, is used to
determine the severity of this failure. As before, the correction (if required) will be to
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increase the controller gains to speed up the rudder response. However, if | eor | >
0.075 then there is not enough rudder control remaining to correct the problem and
allow the AUV to operate effectively.
In the scenario studied here, both stern rudders are limited to ±0.2 rads.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show e
or
= T and e0>? - N'. Since | eor | < 0.05 this failure is
considered tolerable and a correction is not made. The vehicle is only off course by a
few feet as seen in Figure 3.10. Had this failure been more serious and corrective
action necessary, it could be verified that the observer errors were correct by checking
individual rudder position sensors as in the loose rudder case. Figure 3.11 shows that
the upper stern rudder was limited to 0.2 rads rather than saturating at 0.4 rads as it
should have if it had its full range of motion.
3. Stuck Rudder
A rudder is stuck if it will not move regardless of the signals sent to the servo
mechanism. This can be caused by some foreign object preventing the rudder's
movement, or maybe the commanded rudder signal simply is not getting to the servo
to change the rudder's position. Since the normal and failed responses of nearly all the
signals studied in this work show a definite difference in steady state, no maneuver is
required to verify it. However, the actions required are a little more complicated than
in the loose or stroke limited cases; and a maneuver will be required anyway to ensure
the vehicle can still operate effectively.
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The way to combat this failure is to first get the vehicle pointed in the right
direction again. This is done by adding a bias to ^¥coa that will account for the servo
error. This bias is the only one that is added to affect a change in the vehicle's
subsystems. Other bias signals must be added for the purpose of removing the steady
state differences between the normal and failed responses so that the steering errors are
compensated. For example, the controller will still receive ^ from the state estimator,
however the failure detection software will get V)+v • Other signals besides ^
bias
that require bias additions are £ (this resets e
or) and es . Now, as in the loose or stroke
limited cases, the steering system dynamics have been slowed because the remaining
rudders are compensating for the stuck rudder. So again the maneuver of Figure 3.1
must be executed to see if the controller gains must be raised to allow the vehicle to




> 0.075, at which
point the mission must be aborted.
In the stuck rudder scenario from Table 3.1, e
or
= 'S' and eoT -N' (Figures 3.12
and 3.13). Individual rudder sensors must be used to verify that the observer errors
are not incorrect and to ensure that the wrong failure is not being evaluated. The
signals that the AUV would analyze in the case of no rudder response are similar to
the stuck rudder case, except for the rudder position. Figure 3.14 shows the upper
stern rudder is stuck. The next thing to check is the servo error; if it is increasing
without bound then the vehicle can not correct the stuck rudder problem using the
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other rudders and the mission would be aborted. In this case, however, servo error
does not increase without bound (Figure 3.15). Now the vehicle must be pointed in
the right direction and the proper biases must be inserted. Then the maneuver of
Figure 3.1 must be performed to determine if controller gain change is required. In
this case |e
or |
< 0.05 (see Figure 3.12), so no gain changes are necessary. The
vehicle's path for this scenario is shown in Figure 3.16.
4. Hard Rudder
Simply put, a hard rudder is just a special case of a stuck rudder. In this case
the rudder is stuck at an angle of ±0.4 rads (the maximum rudder angle allowed). It
can be caused by the same things that created the stuck rudder. It can also be caused
by a wire that has shorted itself to some source of voltage that would then saturate the
signal going to the servo mechanism. Since this is still a stuck rudder case the
indications are the same; and the actions required to combat the failure are identical to
those of the stuck rudder case.
In the scenario studied here (Table 3.1) both stern rudders are stuck hard at 0.4
rads. Again it is shown that e
or
= 'S' and e0>P ='N' (Figures 3.17 and 3.18), as in the
stuck rudder case. Rudder sensors are checked to ensure the observer errors are
correct and that it is not a 'no rudder response' case. The servo error is then checked
(Figure 3.19) and it is found to be increasing without bound. This makes sense
because the stem rudders have a larger effect on vehicle steering than the bow rudders.
This is due to the larger moment arm of the stern rudders, since they are located
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further from the center of gravity than the bow rudders. The mission must be aborted
since the vehicle can only go in circles (Figure 3.20).
5. No Rudder Response
In this case none of the rudders move in response to a commanded course
change. This could happen if all four rudders were simultaneously stuck at zero or if
8com = due to a wire being shorted to ground. In the scenario of Table 3.1 the
vehicle first detects that e
or
= 'S' and e y -N' (Figures 3.21 and 3.22). The rudder
sensors are then checked and it is found that they are all stuck at zero. Figure 3.23
shows the upper stern rudder response and it is in fact stuck at zero. Also, the vehicle
continues to move in the same direction despite the commanded course change (Figure
3.24). The wiggle of Figure 3.1 can be attempted to see if maybe this is a temporary
condition, but if no response is noted by the rudders the mission must be aborted.
F. YAW RATE SENSOR FAILURES
1. Increased Yaw Rate Sensor Noise
Many different types of interference can increase sensor noise. The worst kind
of interference can come from jamming, which is very possible if the AUV is used for
military purposes such as mine countermeasures. In this work a 90 degree heading
change was ordered while the r sensor experienced a noise increase by a factor of ten.
From Figure 3.25 it can be seen that the vehicle's path was nearly unaffected by the
increased noise. It is therefore assumed that a noise increase in the r sensor does not
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constitute a failure and the detection software will not even consider it an option when
conducting failure analysis.
2. Loss of Yaw Rate Sensor
If the vehicle experiences a loss of r sensor input, the state estimator will
simply receive sensor noise. Similarly, if the entire sensor is lost (no output) the state
estimator will receive an input of r = 0. Both cases are lumped into one here since the
sensor noise has little effect anyway. In the scenario found on Table 3.1, the loss of
input to the r sensor is used to study this failure. Figure 3.26 shows that by losing the
r sensor the vehicle can still operate effectively. Given a 90 degree turn it is off
course by only about six feet (less than a ship length). Therefore, this is not a failure
that even needs to be accounted for by the detection software. However, we now
know that if a more severe failure occurs in the r sensor, the solution will be to ignore
the sensor's output and call it zero.
3. Saturated Yaw Rate Sensor
A saturated r sensor could occur when there's a short in the sensor circuit. The
severity of this failure on the vehicle's path can be seen in Figure 3.27. To determine
this failure has occurred the vehicle circuitry would detect that eor = 'S' and e y - S'
(Figures 3.28 and 3.29). It can be verified that the observer errors are accurate by
checking that there is a steady state e
s
(Figure 3.30) while 5com steadies out to zero
(Figure 3.31). The response to this failure is to ignore the r sensor output and set it to
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zero. This is the chosen action since it has already been shown that the vehicle can
operate effectively without the sensor.
4. Bias On Yaw Rate Sensor
The effect on the vehicle's path of a bias on the r sensor is shown in Figure
3.32. Again e
or
= 'S' and eo4, -S' (Figures 3.33 and 3.34). As in the saturated sensor
case, verification can be obtained by showing that there is a steady state e
s
(Figure
3.35) while 8com steadies out to zero (Figure 3.36). The proper response would be to
operate without the sensor, as was done in the saturated case.
G. HEADING ANGLE SENSOR FAILURES
The study of *P sensor failures is simple and straight forward. The *P sensor is
the primary sensor of the steering system, so its importance can not be
overemphasized. Since it is desired that failures not occur with this sensor, it is
proposed that the vehicle be supplied with three of them. This does not mean three
separate inertial units are required; magnetic compasses are low cost and reasonably
accurate. When one sensor fails there will still be two more to supply the correct
heading. The two failure modes studied in this work were chosen to show the
importance of having three sensors. With this in mind, there will be no discussion as
to how it will be detected or what actions will be taken. With three sensors on board
it will be assumed that failures of the *F sensor will not occur.
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With a stuck ¥ sensor the vehicle can not measure its heading (knowing only
one direction). As soon as a T
coin other than the stuck position of *F is ordered the
vehicle will simply move around in circles (Figure 3.37). This would be difficult to
detect and correct since e
s
(Figure 3.38) and r (Figure 3.39) contradict each other. The
constant e
s
would indicate the vehicle is traveling in a straight line, but the constant r
indicates it is moving in a circle.
An unknown sensor bias added to *F would cause the vehicle to move in the
wrong direction. It would alter the AUV's course by an amount equal to ^^ (Figure
3.40). What is even worse than this is the fact that this failure mode is completely
undetectable. Figures 3.41 through 3.44 show e
or ,
eoY , es and 5com , respectively. The
only significant difference between the normal and failed responses occurs at five
seconds when the bias is inserted. Once the bias is inserted, the normal and failed
responses are identical. If the bias already existed, it would not be detected.
Similarly, if the occurrence of the bias was caught it would not be able to verify it. It
is possible that a problem like this could be noted on successive navigational fixes, but
then the system would have to be able to distinguish between T^ and normal set and
drift.
H. SUMMARY
It must be noted here that when the AUV controller detects a failure and
responds accordingly, it does not necessarily know the exact nature of the failure. For
example, whether the r sensor is saturated or has a bias is not a concern. The system
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need only know that there is an r sensor problem so that its value can be ignored and
set to zero for the estimator. Similarly, the procedure used to correct a rudder failure
seeks only to ensure the vehicle can operate effectively. It does not care which rudder
is actually causing the problem. This extra information can be determined when the
mission is over and the vehicle can be tested.
In this chapter a comprehensive FMEA was conducted on the Phoenix AUV
steering system. Several possible failure modes were analyzed. The results of these
analyses provide methods to detect the various failures and what to do when they
occur. These results have been ordered into a useful algorithm to be incorporated in
the AUV's software for failure detection and resolution. This algorithm has been
included in this work as Appendix D.
Remember that this chapter deals only with the steering system. The algorithm
of Appendix D would obviously be running in conjunction with other failure detection
algorithms. For example, there should also be algorithms for the propulsion and
diving systems. It is a fact that when there is a stuck rudder (and the other rudders
are turned to make up for this) the drag from the rudders will slow the vehicle down.
Also, the act of conducting a turn will slow down the vehicle. Speed was not
considered to be a signal monitored by the steering system. However, the propulsion
system could be used to distinguish between a stuck rudder and no rudder response,
rather than measuring all the individual rudder position sensors. A reduction in speed,
as sensed by the propulsion system, could indicate the rudders have moved. Finally,
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in the case of a rudder failure (such as a stuck rudder), the propulsion system may also
need to take action, such as increasing propeller rpm's to maintain speed.
The last issue needing some attention is the action taken when the failure
detection system is not working properly. What happens if the detection system reads
a combination of signals that it can not map to a specific failure mode? The worst
case must always be assumed. In this case it must be assumed that the failure
detection system is not working properly. Therefore, if a failure occurs it may not see
it. There can only be one solution to this dilemma: abort mission.
43
Table 3.1 Failure Scenarios
Failure Mode Failure Scenario
Loose rudder Ycom changed to -1.571 rads at 5 seconds.
6
urb and 6 lrb stuck at zero
Stroke limited rudder Tcom changed to -1.571 rads at 5 seconds.
6
urs
and 6 lrs limited to + 0.2 rads
Stuck rudder Tcom changed to -1 .571 rads at 30 seconds.
6
urs




lrs go hard over to 0.4 rads at 5 seconds
No rudder response Tcom changed to -1.571 rads at 5 seconds.
All rudders stuck at 0.0 rads
Increased r sensor noise Ycom changed to -1 .571 rads at 30 seconds.
Sensor noise increased 10X throughout simulation
Loss of input to r sensor Tcom changed to -1.571 rads at 5 seconds.
No sensor input (reading noise only)
Saturated r sensor Sensor saturates (r = 0.873 rad/s) at 5 seconds
Bias on r sensor Ycom changed to -1 .571 rads at 20 seconds.
Bias of 0.2 rad/s inserted at 5 seconds
Stuck ¥ sensor Ycom changed to -0.524 rads at 5 seconds.
Sensor stuck at 0.0 rads
Bias on T sensor Tcom changed to -1.571 rads at 30 seconds.
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Figure 3.8 Stroke Limited Rudder (eor vs time).
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Figure 3.23 No Rudder Response (5^ vs time).
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Figure 3.26 Loss of Input to r Sensor (Position Plot).
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Figure 3.28 Saturated r Sensor (eor vs time).
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Figure 3.30 Saturated r Sensor (es vs time).
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Figure 3.34 Bias on r Sensor (eoT vs time).
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Figure 3.35 Bias on r Sensor (es vs time).
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Figure 3.36 Bias on r Sensor (5com vs time).
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Figure 3.38 Stuck ¥ Sensor (e s vs time).














5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time (sec)

























Figure 3.40 Bias on ¥ Sensor (Position Plot).
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Figure 3.44 Bias on *F Sensor '5com vs time).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown here that SIMULINK can be used to design an effective
FMEA tool. The steering system of the Phoenix AUV was modeled and used to
simulate possible associated failure modes. The problem of inserting failures was
solved through the use of switches that were actuated by a running clock during the
simulations. These switches made the simulator more user friendly, allowing the
scenario of any simulation to be easily changed at will.
Through intensive study it was found that observer errors could be used to
determine if a failure has occurred. These observer errors can also be used to
determine the type of failure that has occurred (rudder or sensor). Other signals
available to the AUV are used to verify these findings. It was also determined that
rudder failures are far more complex to analyze and resolve than sensor failures. Also,
since some failures can only be detected during a heading change, it was decided that
a maneuver must be executed to verify these failures. This maneuver would also be
performed periodically when the vehicle is travelling in a straight line, thus allowing it
to essentially verify every now and then that everything is operating properly.
When a loose or stroke limited rudder occurs vehicle dynamics will be slowed.
The magnitude of e
or
can be used to measure the severity of the failure. If it is low,
no corrective action is needed. However, certain failures will require that the
controller gains be increased to speed up the response of the operable rudders; still
other cases will require that the mission be aborted.
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The occurrence of a stuck rudder (hard rudder included) requires that we check
e
s
first. If it is not increasing without bound, then the vehicle may be able to correct
the problem, otherwise it must abort the mission. To correct this problem a bias is
added to *Fcwn so as to get the vehicle pointed in the right direction again. Biases are
added to various other signals to compensate for their errors. Now the vehicle
responds as though it has a loose or stroke limited rudder, and the procedures
governing those failures must now be followed.
When there is no rudder response the steering system can not perform its
function, therefore the mission must be aborted. To the failure detection system no
rudder response looks a lot like a stuck rudder. For this reason the individual rudder
position sensors must be checked to verify the correct failure before taking corrective
action.
Yaw rate sensor failures are more cut and dry than rudder failures. Increased
sensor noise and loss of sensor do not affect the vehicle enough to even be called
failures, therefore they do not need to be watched for. However, the fact that a loss of
r sensor will not adversely affect the vehicle makes it easy to respond to any other r
sensor failures. If the sensor incurs a bias or becomes saturated, the solution is simply
to ignore it and use a value of zero for the estimator
Since the ¥ sensor is the primary sensor of the steering system, it was assumed
and later proven that preventing failures was the better way to go than trying to detect
and correct them. By providing the AUV with three auctioneered sensors, it can be
assumed that failures associated with ¥ will not happen.
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Finally, to sum up all the results obtained in this work dealing with detecting
and correcting failures, an algorithm was developed (Appendix D). This algorithm
needs only to be converted into a useful format for insertion into the AUV tactical
level software for testing.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The FMEA tool that has been designed here is capable of simulating the
occurrence of any failure mode. The results of the simulation can then be compared to
a normal response. This is the scope of what the tool can do. It is recommended that
before the algorithm of Appendix D be tested on the vehicle, it should be tested
through simulation. The simulator should be run in conjunction with the algorithm,
however the simulator must be modified to be able to take the proper corrective
actions as determined by the algorithm. Once the validity of the algorithm has been
proven through simulation, it can then be loaded into the AUV's software and tested in
a real environment.
It is also recommended that the analyses done in this work be done to the other
Phoenix subsystems, such as propulsion and diving systems. Also, once an algorithm
exists for each subsystem of the AUV, they must be coupled to work together in
keeping the vehicle operational. For example, the propulsion system is affected by
rudder changes. The analyses done on the steering system assume that speed is kept
constant by the propulsion system.
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Finally, the simulator designed in this work assumes that only r and *F are
measured, therefore v only has an estimated value. Since we know that v can be
measured using the doppler sonar, the simulator could be redesigned to include a
measured v. It may be beneficial to perform the FMEA with a measured v. On the
other hand, the addition of another sensor adds another set of possible sensor failures,
and it has already been proven that the steering system can operate effectively with the
*P sensor alone.
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APPENDIX B. MATLAB PROGRAM USED TO GENERATE SYSTEM
NOISE FOR INCORPORATION INTO THE VEHICLE







for i = l :m
S(i)=8.1e-3*32.2"2/ (w( i) "5 ) *exp (-33 . 56/h~2/ (w(i) "4
end ;
ws=[0.3 : 0.05:2] ;
t=[0:0. 1:100] ;
Y=zeros ( 1 , length (t) )
;
for i=l : length (ws)
;
phi=rand ( 1 , length (ws ) )
;
phi =phi -mean (phi )
;
y (i, : )= (sqrt (S(i) *2*dw) ) *cos (ws (i) *t+phi (i) *pi*2) ;
end;
for j=l : length (ws)
;








APPENDIX G MATLAB FUNCTION USED TO AUCTIONEER AND
AVERAGE THREE OBSERVATION ERRORS




uu=u ( 1 ) +u ( 2 ) +u.( 3 ) ;
if abs (u ( 1 ) ) >=eps










if abs (u ( 3 ) ) >=eps










APPENDIX D. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR LINKING CORRECTIVE
ACTIONS TO DETECTED FAILURE EFFECTS




- ignore sensor output
- change controller gains
1. if e
or





= T or e^ = T then
e
or
= 'N' and eoT = 'N'
























add bias to x¥com so that the vehicle will head in the right direction
add biases to ,*, a and ec in order to equate the normal and failedV, r s





'S' and eo4, = 'S' and es = 'S' and 5com -+ then





= T and eo4, = 'N' and any 5, * 8com (i = 1,4) then
if 0.05 < | eor | < 0.075 then
change controller gains to speed up rudder response
endif




7. end of algorithm
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